We assess the response of …scal policy to developments in asset markets in the US. We estimate …scal policy rules augmented with aggregate wealth, wealth composition (i.e. …nancial and housing wealth) and asset prices (i.e. stock and housing prices) using: (i) a linear framework based on a fully simultaneous system approach; and (ii) two nonlinear speci…cations that rely on a smooth transition regression (STR) and a Markov-switching (MS) model.
Introduction
The recent …nancial turmoil brought the linkages between the …nancial markets, the banking system, the housing sector and the monetary framework to the frontline of policy making. Its dramatic impact on the global economy highlighted the need to complement a quick and targeted response by monetary authorities with a robust implementation of …scal packages by governments aimed at boosting output.
These unconventional interventions took place in reaction to such an extraordinary event and, despite the consensual view on the withdrawal of such stimulus as the recovery materializes, 1 the uncertainty regarding the economic path and the concerns about long-term (un)sustainability of public …nances, on the one hand, and the pressure for avoiding similar episodes in the future, on the other hand, might demand for a more systematic response from …scal authorities.
The deepening of the crisis was mainly driven by the sharp collapse of asset prices (after several years of boom) and simultaneous destruction of …nancial and housing wealth. Not surprisingly, we have assisted to an interesting debate on the opportunity to target asset markets in the conduct of economic policies aimed at avoiding the repetition of similar episodes and at reducing the risk of uncoventional …scal and monetary interventions. Therefore, under the ongoing securitization process of the housing and …nancial sectors which implies the transfer of assets and risk to the private sector, wealth may be considered as a valid complementary target variable entering the policymaking rule.
The dynamics of asset prices and wealth composition is indeed of great importance for …nancial institutions and homeowners and the empirical evidence suggests that monetary authorities should pay a close attention to those developments. In fact, several papers have emphasized the existing nexus between monetary stability and …nancial markets stability (Granville and Mallick, 2009; Sousa, 2010a Sousa, , 2010b Castro, 2011) , the implications for the macroeconomy (Ra…q and Mallick, 2008 ; Mohsin, 2007, 2010 ) and the role of market segmentation (Blenman, 1991) .
Booms and busts in stock and housing markets have been widely considered as important events in determining the occurrence of economic crises (Agnello and Nerlich, 2010; Agnello and Schuknecht, 2011 ) and a number of studies has focused on the appropriateness of the monetary policy strategy in the presence of such episodes (Detken and Smets, 2004) and, in general, on the opportunity to consider asset prices as part of monetary policy goals (Issing, 2009) . Similarly, the relationship between monetary policy, macroeconomic variables and wealth has gained a new interest in recent 1 Interestingly, Heim (2010a Heim ( , 2010b shows that government de…cits crowd out both private consumption and investment. However, while government spending de…cits are associated with a complete crowding-out e¤ect (i.e. no net stimulus impact), tax cut de…cits result in net negative economic e¤ects. In addition, Heim (2010c) …nds that, calculating the e¤ects for recession and non-recession periods and comparing them to models with average crowd out and models without crowd out, one concludes that the magnitude of the crowding-out e¤ects is roughly the same.
times: some authors focused on the importance of contagion e¤ects during …nancial crises episodes (Blenman, 2004) , while others analyzed how wealth e¤ects modify the central bank's reaction function (Sousa, 2009; Castro and Sousa, 2010) and its transmission mechanisms on the components of aggregate demand (Sousa, 2010c) .
Despite this, the empirical evidence on the reaction of …scal authorities to asset markets is still at an early stage. In fact, while the existing studies have typically explored the links between stock and housing prices and …scal policy (Tagkalakis, 2011; Agnello and Sousa, 2011) , our knowledge about the response of governments to the composition of wealth is still incomplete.
It is well known that asset markets react to economic developments and policy decisions and consumers respond to changes in their wealth composition. The "wealth" channel characterizes this mechanism: changes in policy measures in ‡uence asset values, which, in turn, a¤ect economic activity (for instance, consumer spending on nondurable goods and services and investment in gross …xed capital formation and housing infrastructure, but also government revenue via taxation and primary spending via discretionary policies). Therefore, it is the change in the "wealth" bundle i.e. the variation in the "price-quantity" set that can make economic agents more prone to adjust their demand patterns which …scal policymakers may decide to stabilize. For instance, a signi…cant increase in housing prices can lead to a rise in housing wealth and, consequently, boost consumption.
In the case of overheating of the economy, a rule targeting asset prices would demand tightening of …scal policy. However, the increase in housing prices may also trigger a rise in housing costs and generate a drop in housing wealth, whereby consumption spending would be reduced. In this context, the policy response to the dynamics of housing prices would imply an expansionary …scal policy (e.g. tax reduction). Putting it di¤erently, housing prices could provide an uncertain signal to the …scal authority. This problem would be avoided if wealth developments were directly tracked: the increase (decrease) in housing wealth would forecast a rise (drop) in future aggregate demand (via the wealth channel) and the …scal policymaker could react by rising (cutting) taxes and/or cutting (rising) expenditure. Similarly, an increase in stock prices could signal either a rise in market valuation of …nancial assets that is driven by fundamentals or a potential bubble, in which case, business cycle stabilization would demand di¤erent policy measures. On the contrary, a vigilant follow-up of the dynamics of …nancial wealth would allow governments to foresee market tensions and provide an unequivocal response to them (e.g. via taxation on capital gains). All these arguments would justify the estimation of a …scal policy rule augmented with housing and …nancial wealth vis-a-vis housing and stock prices.
In this paper, we try to contribute to the literature by estimating …scal policy rules with the aim of understanding the government's response to both …nancial and housing wealth developments.
Speci…cally, we compare the formulation of …scal policy in the context of "asset price" e¤ects (i.e., the reaction of the government to stock and housing prices) and "asset wealth" e¤ects (that is, the response of the …scal authority to …nancial and housing wealth). As a result, we estimate linear …scal policy reaction functions using a fully simultaneous system approach, allowing for simultaneity between the …scal instrument and a set of macroeconomic variables. In order to account for the e¤ects of asset market developments on the conduction of …scal policy, we augment the policy rules with variables capturing changes in wealth composition or asset prices.
In addition, we assess the existence of nonlinearity in the …scal policy reaction function. As Tagkalakis (2011) notes, governments could start building up …scal bu¤ers in re ‡ex of the valuable information provided by the dynamics of asset prices and the concerns about debt sustainability.
Thus, while …scal authorities can exhibit a linear behaviour regarding asset market movements, they may also have asymmetric preferences and assign di¤erent weights to negative and positive gaps in wealth, asset prices or even output. Putting it di¤erently, the conduction of …scal policy might be conditional on the "state" of the economy in general (for instance, booms versus recessions) and asset markets in particular (for example, whether …nancial wealth is increasing or falling, if housing wealth is booming or shrinking...). We investigate the importance of such nonlinear description of …scal policy behaviour by using a Smooth Transition Regression (STR) model and a MarkovSwitching (MS) framework. These should help us re…ning the characterization about the response of governments to speci…c "states" of asset markets and, therefore, understanding how such wealth dynamics improve the information provided by other economic variables.
Using quarterly data for the US, we show that …scal policy exhibits an important countercyclical behaviour: output has no signi…cant e¤ect on primary spending, while taxes respond substantially to the business cycle. We also …nd evidence of a non-stabilizing e¤ect of government debt over …scal policy: when debt grows, primary spending is raised, and taxes and primary surplus are reduced.
The linear framework suggests that taxes and primary surplus are strongly a¤ected in a negative and signi…cant way by changes in aggregate wealth, but there is little evidence of a response of primary spending to aggregate wealth. Looking at the importance of wealth composition, …nancial wealth seems to play a stronger role. However, while taxes and primary surplus are reduced when …nancial wealth increases, a rise in housing wealth impacts positively on them. As for government spending, the existing evidence does not corroborate a signi…cant reaction to …nancial and housing wealth. In addition, the results show that an increase in stock prices induces a fall in the primary surplus. In contrast, a rise in housing prices has a positive e¤ect on the …scal stance. The negative relationship between taxation and wealth is consistent with the literature supporting the view that …scal policy rules can be designed to steer national wealth to its target value (Blake et al., 1998; Lossani and Tirelli, 1994) .
The estimation of the nonlinear smooth transition regression model indicates that the nonlinear reaction of …scal policy is felt when the policy instruments are the primary spending and …scal balance, and are linked with the behaviour of asset markets, in particular, …nancial wealth and stock prices. In fact, …scal policy is tightened when: (i) the growth rate of aggregate wealth is above the threshold of 1.4%; (ii) stock prices rise well above 9.8%; and (iii) there is accumulation of …nancial wealth in which case …scal policy counterbalances the dynamics of housing wealth.
Finally, the …ndings provided by the Markov-switching model highlight the nonlinearity of the response of both primary spending and taxes to aggregate wealth, wealth composition and asset prices. In fact, …scal policy behaviour signi…cantly changes during periods characterized by sharp corrections of output or even recessions: in a context of economic distress, …scal policy becomes expansionary, thereby, partially o¤setting the decline in wealth. Moreover, …scal authorities counteract the fall in …nancial wealth and stock prices, namely, by cutting government taxation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the linkages between …scal policy and asset markets. Section 3 presents the estimation methodologies. Understanding the …scal policy reaction to wealth composition or asset prices emerges as a very important question for two main reasons. First, in light of the recent developments in asset markets, the literature has started to look at the role played by …scal policy in explaining such dynamics.
Second, the theoretical relevance of the linkages between the dynamics of asset prices and the process of wealth accumulation suggests that the performance of a …scal policy rule accounting for "asset price" and "asset wealth" e¤ects deserves an econometric evaluation.
In this context, we start by describing the recent, but yet limited, developments of the existing literature on that matter.
Why should one expect a relationship between …scal policy and stock prices?
The stock market boom of the late nineties and the subsequent burst of the technological bubble generated important changes in the stance of …scal policy, making it apparent that stock price changes can in ‡uence government balances. Despite being typically assessed through the lenses of monetary policy (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) , the dynamics between economic policy and …nancial markets is relevant and some recent studies also consider the role of …scal policy. (Schuknecht and Eschenbanch, 2004) . In fact, …nancial markets and, in particular, asset prices can a¤ect the government budget via two major mechanisms: (i) the "direct" channel, through certain revenue categories; and (ii) the "indirect" channel, through the feedback e¤ect on real economic activity. In the case of the "direct" channel, an increase in stock prices can have a positive impact on capital gains-losses related taxes, government revenue from households and corporations and turnover taxes (i.e. changes in government revenue via transactions in assets) and, consequently, can in ‡uence the …scal stance. As for the "indirect" channel, higher stock prices can lead to a rise in consumer's con…dence and household's wealth, boosting consumption and real economic activity and, thereby, increasing government revenue. In contrast, a sharp correction in stock prices and the design of …scal stimulus packages can raise costs to governments and, therefore, deteriorate the public …nances. Moreover, a greater uncertainty about the long-run sustainability of public …nances may lead investors to demand a higher risk premium, thereby, impacting on the relative term spread. This, in turn, can severely deteriorate the …scal stance in re ‡ex of the increase in costs of (re)…nancing the debt. 
Why should a link between …scal policy and housing prices exist?
As with stock prices, the linkages between economic policy and housing prices have been typically considered in the context of monetary policy (Aoki et al., 2004; Iacoviello, 2005) . However, the dynamics of housing markets can be also in ‡uenced by a variety of …scal measures such as:
(i) capital taxes on housing gains, (ii) reduced VAT on home purchases; (iii) tax deductibility of interest payments; (iv) taxation of the imputed rental housing value; and (v) subsidies for …rst-house purchases. Moreover, sovereign …nancing needs and …scal stance can indirectly in ‡uence housing prices through the impact on a country's interest rates and mortgage-loans and resources available to home-owners can be crowded-out in case of higher government indebtedness (MacLennan et al.,
1999).
In the few studies looking at the interaction between …scal policy and asset markets, the research has mostly looked at the potential impact of …scal policy on …nancial and/or housing prices, rather than assessing the response of …scal authorities to developments in those markets via the estimation of a policy rule. For instance, Afonso and Sousa (2011a) investigate the macroeconomic e¤ects of …scal policy using a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression approach. Using an identi…cation of …scal policy shocks based on a recursive scheme and data for Germany, Italy, UK and US, the authors show that government spending shocks, in general, have a small e¤ect on GDP, lead to important "crowding-out" e¤ects, have a varied impact on housing prices and generate a quick fall in stock prices. Afonso and Sousa (2011b) use a fully simultaneous system of equations and the same set of four countries and …nd that unexpected variation in …scal policy can substantially increase the variability of housing and stock prices. Agnello and Sousa (2010) use a panel of ten industrialized countries and show that a positive …scal shock has a negative (although quick and temporary) impact on stock prices and a negative (although gradual and very persistent) e¤ect on housing prices. Consequently, they argue that the attempts of …scal policy to mitigate stock price developments may severely de-stabilize housing markets. Agnello and Sousa (2011) also point out to signi…cant …scal multiplier e¤ects, in particular, in the context of severe housing busts, which gives rise to the importance of the implementation of …scal stimulus packages. Notably, Tagkalakis (2011) provides estimations of …scal policy reaction functions that look into the links between …nancial market movements and …scal policy outcomes. The author highlights that, although stock prices a¤ect both government revenues and primary spending, the most important e¤ect on …scal balances is due to changes in housing prices.
Why should one expect a relationship between …scal policy and wealth?
As discussed above, the existing studies have typically focused on asset prices, therefore, not targeting the reaction of governments to household's wealth. Generally speaking, the increase in stock or housing prices can in ‡uence consumption. However, it is the change in the "price-quantity" bundle, i.e. variation in the wealth counterparts (…nancial and housing wealth) that can produce substantial variation in personal savings. When the corporate sector does not compensate the change in households'savings, it is then left for the government to allow for a variation in its own (2010) also suggest that wealth composition is important in the formulation of monetary policy although the reaction to "price" e¤ects is smaller. Additionally, the authors account for the nonlinearity of the relationship between monetary policy and wealth and …nd that concerns over wealth and its components are stronger once in ‡ation is under control, i.e. below a certain target.
Empirical Methodology

The Fully Simultaneous System of Equations
We estimate the following Structural VAR (SVAR)
where (L) is a matrix valued polynomial in positive powers of the lag operator L, n is the number of variables in the system, and " t is a vector of fundamental economic shocks that span the space of innovations to X t . The "reduced form" form of (1) can be expressed as We do not assume that the government reacts only to variables that are predetermined relative to policy shocks, and assume that there are no predetermined variables with respect to …scal policy shock. The economy is divided into three sectors: a …nancial, a public and a production sector. The …nancial sector -summarized by the …nancial wealth measure, f w t (or the stock price index, sp t ) -reacts contemporaneously to all new information, in recognition of the fact that this component of wealth is determined in markets characterized by a continuous auction structure. The public sector -that allows for simultaneous e¤ects -comprises the equations for primary government spending, g t , and government revenue, t t , or primary government surplus, gs t , and links them with the real GDP, y t , and the government debt, b t . The production sector consists of the real GDP, y t , the government debt, b t , and the housing wealth measure, hw t (or the housing price index, hp t ). The orthogonalization within this sector is irrelevant to identify …scal policy shocks correctly. All these variables are not predetermined relative to the …scal policy shocks but it is assumed that the policy shock can in ‡uence them contemporaneously.
Additionally, we adopt an identi…cation of the …scal policy shocks based on Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004) . This identi…cation scheme consists of two steps: (i) institutional information about taxes and transfers and the timing of tax collections is used to identify the automatic response of taxes and government spending to economic activity, that is, to compute the elasticity of government revenue and spending to macroeconomic variables; and (ii) the …scal policy shock is then estimated.
While estimating the …scal policy rule, we consider several speci…cations, namely, by linking the …scal policy instrument (i.e. either the primary government spending, g t , or the government revenue, t t , or the primary government surplus, gs t ) with the real GDP, y t , the government debt, b t , and:
(i) aggregate wealth, w t ; and (ii) …nancial wealth, f w t , and housing wealth, hw t . These di¤erent policy reactions allow us to understand how the …scal authority reacts to wealth composition.
The identifying restrictions on the matrix of contemporaneous e¤ects, 0 , can be de…ned as: ; where the parameters g;y and t;y are the elasticities of, respectively, government spending and government revenue with regards to GDP and can be identi…ed using external information. These are set in accordance with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Sousa (2011a, 2011b) , that is, g;y = 0 and t;y = 1:85.
The identi…cation can be summarized in the following table where "+" indicates non-zero elements and we add a triangular orthogonalization for the production sector that is irrelevant for the identi…cation of the …scal policy shock. Then, we assess the adjustment of …scal policy in the outcome of changes in asset prices. More speci…cally, we estimate a policy rule that links the …scal instrument with the real GDP, y t , the government debt, b t , the stock price index, sp t , and the housing price index, hp t . In this way, we are able to detect whether the government reacts di¤erently to changes in the wealth composition vis-a-vis changes in asset prices. This analysis is crucial as it makes possible to infer about the weights that the …scal authority puts into asset markets'"quantity" and "price" e¤ects.
Finally, the fully simultaneous identi…cation scheme as de…ned above implies that the estimates of 0 are obtained via numerical maximization of the integrated likelihood. The probability bands for the impulse-response functions should be constructed by drawing jointly from the posterior distribution of B (L) and 0 . Given that the integrated likelihood is not in the form of any standard probability density function, one cannot draw 0 from it directly to make inference.
We solve this problem by: (i) taking draws for 0 using an importance sampling approach that combines the posterior distribution with the asymptotic distribution of 0 ; and (ii) drawing B (L) from its posterior distribution conditional on 0 . Probability bands are then constructed from the weighted percentiles of the impulse-response functions. A standard STR model for a nonlinear …scal rule can be de…ned as follows:
The Smooth Transition Regression Model
where F I t denotes the …scal policy instrument (g t , t t , gs t ) and z t = (1; z 1t ; :::z kt ) is a vector of k explanatory variables. The vectors = ( 0 ; 1 ; :::; k ) and ! = (! 0 ; ! 1 ; :::; ! k ) represent the parameter vectors in the linear and nonlinear parts of the model, respectively. In total, we may have 2(k + 1) parameters to estimate, but some of these may be zero a priori. The disturbance term is assumed to be independent and identically distributed with zero mean and constant variance, " t iid(0; 2 ). The transition function G( ; c; s t ) is continuous and bounded between zero and one in the transition variable s t , that is: as s t ! 1, G( ; c; s t ) ! 0; and as s t ! +1, G( ; c; s t ) ! 1.
s t , can be an element of z t or even a linear combination of elements of z t (or a simple deterministic trend).
We start by considering G( ; c; s t ) as a logistic function of order one:
This kind of STR model is called logistic STR model or LSTR1 model. In this case, the transition function is a monotonically increasing function of s t , where the slope parameter, , indicates the smoothness of the transition from one regime to another, i.e. it shows how rapid the transition from zero to unity is, as a function of s t . Finally, the location parameter, c, determines where the transition occurs. Considering this framework, the LSTR1 model can describe relationships that change according to the level of the threshold variable and, consequently, an asymmetric reaction of the government to, for example, a high and a low debt regime.
The STR model is equivalent to a linear model with stochastic time-varying coe¢ cients and, as so, it can be rewritten as:
The combined parameters, , will ‡uctuate between and + ! and change monotonically as a function of s t . The more the transition variable moves beyond the threshold, the closer G( ; c; s t ) will be to one, and the closer will be to + !. Similarly, the further s t approaches the threshold, c, the closer the transition function will be to zero and the closer will be to .
Given that a monotonic transition may not be a satisfactory alternative, we will also consider (and test for) the presence of a non-monotonic transition function. This can be the case where governments consider not a simple point target for the transition variable, but a band or an inner regime where the transition variable is considered to be under control. Consequently, the reaction of the …scal authority will be di¤erent from the situation where transition variable is outside that regime.
We consider the following logistic function of order two: with a third-order Taylor-series expansion around the null hypothesis. This approximation yields, after some simpli…cations and re-parameterisations, the following auxiliary regression: 
where " t = " t + ! 0 z t R( ; c; s t ), with the remainder R( ; c; s t ), z t = (1; e z 0 t ) 0 , and e z t is a (k 1)
vector of explanatory variables. Moreover, j = e j , where e j is a function of ! and c. The null hypothesis of linearity becomes H 01 : 1 = 2 = 3 = 0, against the alternative of H 11 : 9 j 6 = 0; j = 1; 2; 3. An LM-test can be used to investigate this hypothesis because, under the null, " t = " t .
The resulting asymptotic distribution is 2 with 3k degrees of freedom under the null (Teräsvirta, 1998 There is a …nal question to answer before proceeding with the estimation of the nonlinear model:
Which transition function should be employed? The decision between an LSTR1 and an LSTR2 model can be made from the following sequence of null hypotheses based on the auxiliary regression:
H 02 : 3 = 0; H 03 : 2 = 0j 3 = 0; and H 04 : 1 = 0j 3 = 2 = 0. Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) show that the decision rule works as follows: if the p-value from the rejection of H 03 is the lowest one, we should choose an LSTR2 model; otherwise, the LSTR1 model should be selected. We should note that there are at least two important conceptual di¤erences between MSR and STR models. First, the MSR incorporates less prior information than the STR approach. Indeed, regime probabilities in a MSR model can be interpreted as a transition function that is estimated directly from the data. In contrast, the speci…cation of the transition function in the STR framework requires the choice of a transition variable (which is sometimes a di¢ cult task). Second, the MSR model allows to immediately infer from the data the timing of signi…cant changes in the behavior of the dependent variables, whereas STR models control for the possibility of abrupt changes occuring when the level of the transition variable is below or above a certain threshold value.
The Markov-Switching Framework
The MSR counterpart of equation (3) can be written as:
where F I t is the …scal policy instrument, while z t denotes the vector of explanatory variables including the intercept. 2 is the vector of non-switching parameters while ! represents the vector of parameters that vary across di¤erent regimes s t with s t 2 f1; :::mg. We also assume that the variance of the disturbance term is regime-dependent, i.e. " t js t N (0; 2 (s t )).
Denoting by p ij the unconditional transition probability that s t = i when the state at date (t 1) is s t 1 = j, i.e. p ij = P fs t = ijs t 1 = jg, the Markov-Switching model assumes that the matrix P of the transition probabilities [p ij ] is constant over time and sums up all time-dependence between the states, i.e. p i1 + p i2 + ::: + p im = 1. Under these conditions, the model can be estimated using Maximum-Likelihood Estimator (MLE) and an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm as discussed by Hamilton (1990) .
From an analytical point of view, since our …nal aim is to investigate if …scal policy is conducted di¤erently towards wealth composition vis-a-vis asset prices and over di¤erent regimes, we consider that only the coe¢ cients associated to asset values are regime-switching while the relation between the …scal policy indicator, F I t , output, y t , and public debt, b t , is assumed to be linear.
Formally, for each …scal instrument (namely, the primary government spending, g t , government taxes, t t , and primary government surplus, gs t ), we estimate the following …scal reaction functions:
where s t = f1; 2g. The linear part of the model includes the vector of variables z 1t = [y t ; b t ] while the regime-dependent part includes aggregate wealth, w t and its components (…nancial wealth, f w t , and housing wealth, hw t ) -i.e. equations (9) and (10) -or, alternatively, stock prices, sp t , and housing prices, hp t -i.e. equation (11) . We also assume that the intercepts are regime-dependent. The set of variables considered in the econometric methodologies is as follows. First, we use either the primary government spending, g t , the government revenue, t t , or the primary government surplus, gs t , as the …scal policy instrument. Second, regarding macroeconomic aggregates, we consider: the real GDP, y t , and the government debt, b t . Finally, the variables of interest in the …scal policy rule are: (1) the aggregate wealth, w t ; (2) the measure of the …nancial market (that is, either …nancial wealth, f w t , or the stock price index, sp t ); and (3) the measure of the housing market (i.e. either housing wealth, hw t , or the housing price index, hp t ).
Linear Evidence
We start by presenting and discussing the evidence from the estimation of the linear …scal rules using the fully simultaneous system approach described in Section 3.1. Table 1 In what concerns to the reaction of …scal policy to aggregate wealth (Columns 1, 4 and 7), the empirical …ndings show that taxes and primary surplus are strongly a¤ected in a negative and signi…cant way (the coe¢ cients associated to aggregate wealth are -27.659 and -22.994, respectively).
In contrast, there is little evidence of a response of primary spending to aggregate wealth (the coe¢ cient estimate is -7.618).
When we consider wealth composition in the …scal rules (Columns 2, 5 and 8), we conclude that …nancial wealth is the variable that exherts the strongest impact, in particular, for taxes and primary surplus. However, while these policy instruments tend to be lowered when …nancial wealth increases, in contrast, a rise in housing wealth has a positive impact on them. As for government spending, the existing evidence does not corroborate a signi…cant reaction to …nancial and housing wealth.
Finally, we look at the e¤ect of disaggregated asset price variables (i.e. stock and housing prices) on …scal policy (Columns 3, 6 and 9). As can be seen, an increase in stock prices induces a fall in the primary surplus and a rise in government spending. This can be explained by the very small response of taxation to stock prices. On the contrary, both primary spending and taxes respond negatively to a rise in housing prices. However, given that the magnitude of the reaction is similar (-4.578 for government primary spending and -9.187 in the case of taxes), the overall response of primary surplus to housing prices is small, in line with the work of Tagkalakis (2011).
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] Im sum, the linear framework shows that taxes and primary surplus are strongly a¤ected in a negative and signi…cant way by changes in aggregate wealth, but there is little evidence of a response of primary spending to aggregate wealth. The negative link between government revenue and wealth could be, in part, explained by the fact that housing and …nancial wealth are typically related to each other, but sometimes they move in opposite directions. For instance, the equity market fell in the …rst half of 2000s while the housing market was booming. In contrast, between
2006 and the summer of 2007, the housing market cooled down while the stock market moved up.
This argument seems to be con…rmed when we look at the importance of wealth composition. In this case, we …nd that while taxes and primary surplus are reduced when …nancial wealth increases, a rise in housing wealth impacts positively on them. Similarly, an increase in stock prices induces a fall in the primary surplus, but a rise in housing prices has a positive e¤ect on the …scal stance.
From a theoretical point of view, the negative relationship between taxation and wealth also seems consistent with the existing literature that views …scal policy rules as designed to target national wealth (Blake et al., 1998; Lossani and Tirelli, 1994) . Accordingly, …scal policy could accomodate (counteract) a wealth expansion (contraction) when the wealth level is below (above) its target. Under these circumstances, nonlinear models that account for the "state" of the economy and the "state" of asset wealth may be useful to disentangle the relationship between …scal policy and wealth dynamics.
Nonlinear Evidence I
The results from the estimation of the nonlinear STR speci…cations are analyzed in this section. Table 2 reports the estimations.
Nonlinearity is not always present. The linearity tests shown at the bottom of Table 3 In what concerns to the choice of the transition function, the tests indicate that a LSTR1 model …ts better all policy rules (see lines H 02 , H 03 and H 04 ). This means that the …scal authority is more concerned in pursuing a point target than a target range for the respective transition variable. That variable was chosen taking into account the lowest p-value for the rejection of the linear model.
In Columns 1 and 4, aggregate wealth was chosen as the transition variable (given that it presents the lowest p-value for the rejection of the linear model), which means that …scal policy tends to react di¤erently when wealth is above or below a certain threshold. The results show that output has no signi…cant e¤ect on primary spending, con…rming the assumption made in the linear analysis. Hence, primary spending does not react to economic activity. 3 However, the primary government surplus is still reacting positively to output growth. It can also be seen that government debt exherts a non-stabilizing e¤ect over …scal policy. In fact, all regressions show that an increase in debt leads to a rise in primary spending and to a decrease in government surplus, which is in accordance with our theoretical expectations and, once again, in line with the evidence found for the linear framework. We should also notice that the improvement in primary balance when output rises and its deterioration when government debt increases may re ‡ect the dynamics of government revenue along the business cycle and the unstabilizing feedback e¤ect from government debt.
Column 1 also shows that primary spending starts to react to aggregate wealth only when it grows substantially above 1.4%. This means that primary spending will only respond to government debt when wealth is below that threshold; when aggregating wealth grows above that threshold, primary spending will react negatively to further increases in that aggregate. Hence, the systematic response of primary spending to aggregate wealth seems to exhibit a nonlinear pattern. In Column 4, we can see that the reaction of primary surplus to aggregate wealth is also nonlinear, as it only responds (in a positive manner) when the growth rate of wealth is above 1.5%. This is in line with the work of Tagkalakis (2011) who also suggests that …nancial market variables have a positive and signi…cant impact on the …scal stance.
When we consider wealth composition in the …scal policy rule (Column 2), we …nd evidence suggesting that the government adopts a vigilant posture regarding the dynamics of housing wealth:
as in the case of aggregate wealth, primary spending is reduced when housing wealth rises. However, …scal policy does not respond to …nancial wealth in a signi…cant way, despite the fact that this wealth component is the threshold variable. This shows that the government starts reacting to housing wealth only when the growth rate of …nancial wealth is positive. Moreover, it gives rise to the idea that changes in wealth composition play a particular role in the conduction of …scal policy. The results are not substantially di¤erent for primary surplus: Column 5 shows that when housing wealth increases primary surplus is increased, but only if …nancial wealth grows above 3.2%. Hence, …scal policy reacts to wealth components only when they are growing at a relatively good pace; otherwise, the behaviour of the …scal authority is dominated by movements in output and government debt.
Turning now to the reaction of …scal policy to asset prices (Columns 3 and 6), the empirical …ndings show that stock prices emerge as the transition variable. In particular, the response of …scal policy is detected only when the growth rate of stock prices lies well above 9.8%. In this case, the dynamics of primary spending are essentially driven by stock prices, for which there is a negative and statistically signi…cant reaction. Regarding the primary government surplus, we observe that an increase in the stock prices generates a rise in the primary balance, especially, when the growth rate of stock prices is above 9.7%. 4 In contrast, primary spending and government surplus do not seem to respond to movements in housing prices.
Summing up, the smooth transition regression model estimated for the US suggests that both "asset price" and "wealth" e¤ects are relevant for the conduction of the …scal policy. However, stock prices matter more than …nancial wealth while housing wealth seems to be more important than housing prices. On the one hand, this probably re ‡ects the easier monitoring of stock prices as they are available on a real-time basis. On the other hand, it can be linked to the fact that housing prices do not always re ‡ect the market value of residential wealth as a result of the heterogeneity of the quality of real estate assets. Therefore, a larger weight is put into housing wealth in the …scal policy rule.
Nonlinear Evidence II
This Section discusses the evidence from the estimation of the Markov-switching models. Table   3 describes the …ndings. It suggests that the nonlinear speci…cations represent a good description of the behaviour of …scal authorities as supported by the LR statistics. Taxes and primary surplus behave in a cyclical way: a rise in the policy instrument is associated with an increase of output.
As for primary spending, it is negatively linked to changes in output but the associated coe¢ cient is small in magnitude, which is in accordance with the linear framework and the smooth transition regression model in that this component of …scal policy does not react to the business cycle. Interestingly, we also …nd support of an unstabilizing feedback e¤ect from government debt: primary spending (taxes) are lowered (raised) when government debt increases.
In what concerns the response of both primary spending and taxes to aggregate wealth, wealth composition and asset prices, we …nd that this relationship is strongly nonlinear. On the spending side (Columns 1-3), there is a positive and signi…cant link in regime one. The same evidence holds for taxes (Columns 4-6) during regime two. Given that both regimes tend to overlap, we conclude that, in general, an increase in wealth and asset prices leads to an increase in government taxation (e.g. via property taxes or taxes on capital gains) and, ultimately, to a rise in government spending (e.g. investment in infrastructure and public services with high returns for growth). In terms of the impact of wealth composition on …scal policy, we …nd that while housing wealth is the main driver for primary spending, …nancial wealth plays a dominant role for taxes, in particular, in regime one. As for the e¤ects of asset prices, our estimates indicate that both stock and housing prices contribute in a relatively similar manner to …scal policy developments in the two regimes. The results for primary surplus (Columns 7-9) also corroborate these …ndings: it behaves in cyclical way and debt exherts an unstabilizing e¤ect on …scal policy. However, governments seem to be relatively neutral vis-a-vis wealth developments in regime two.
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
The behaviour of …scal policy signi…cantly changes during periods characterized by sharp downward corrections of output or even recessions. Such episodes are broadly captured by spending models in regime two and by tax rules in regime one (see Figure 1) . As for primary spending, we …nd that, in a context of economic distress, …scal policy becomes expansionary, which partially o¤sets the decline in wealth. In particular, the policymaker seems to counteract the decline of …nancial wealth and stock prices. In line with this expansionary strategy, government taxation is reduced, therefore, further boosting aggregate wealth. More speci…cally, the fall in …nancial wealth leads to a cut of taxation in regime two.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
Conclusion
In this work, we analyze the linkages between …scal policy and asset markets through the lenses of …scal policy reaction functions. Using quarterly data for the US, we estimate …scal policy rules augmented with: (i) aggregate wealth; (ii) wealth composition (i.e. …nancial and housing wealth);
and (iii) asset prices (i.e. stock and housing prices). This allow us to compare the adjustment of …scal policy to markets'developments in the context of "asset wealth" and "asset price" e¤ects.
We pay close attention to the design of the …scal policy rule. Speci…cally, we consider a linear policy reaction function based on a fully simultaneous system of equations. In addition, we investigate the existence of nonlinearity in the response of governments to asset markets using a smooth transition regression framework and a Markov-switching model.
The estimated linear policy rules show that, while primary spending does not react to aggregate wealth, taxes and primary surplus are signi…cantly cut when aggregate wealth rises. In addition, although the spending side does not respond to wealth composition, the revenue side is negatively impacted by …nancial wealth and positively a¤ected by housing wealth. Similarly, an increase in stock prices induces a fall in the primary surplus, while a rise in housing prices has a positive e¤ect on the …scal stance.
The results of the estimation of the smooth transition regression model show that nonlinearity describes well the dynamics of primary spending and …scal balance. These policy instruments are adjusted in a nonlinear fashion to: (i) housing wealth, given that it describes the dynamics of housing markets better than housing prices; and (ii) stock prices, for which information is more readily available than …nancial wealth.
Finally, the Markov-switching model emphasizes that …scal policy o¤sets the decline in wealth during periods of …nancial distress. Moreover, the fall in …nancial wealth and stock prices is counteracted by a cut in government taxation.
From a policy perspective, the current paper gives rise to the stabilizing role that …scal policy can play regarding wealth developments. 
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